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enough to artificially simulate their functions. In some areas, like hearing, vision, and prosthetics, there 
have been great advances in the field. Yet there is still much about the brain that is unknown and therefore 
cannot be artificially replicated: How does the brain use language, make complex associations, or 
organize learned experiences? Once the neural pathways responsible for these and many other functions 
are fully understood and reconstructed, we will have the ability to build systems that can match9and 
maybe even exceed9.",#(<-*#&#.#- 
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metric, we understand a bit about physics, less about chemistry, and almost nothing about biology.1  
When we fully understand a phenomenon, we can specify its entire sequence of events, causes, 
and effects so completely that it is possible to fully simulate it, with all its internal mechanisms intact. 
Achieving that level of understanding is rare. It is commensurate with constructing a full design for a 
machine that could serve as a stand-in for the thing being studied.  To understand a phenomenon 
sufficiently to fully simulate it is to understand it computationally.  
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)*-;2 Computational science is the study of the 
hidden rules underlying complex phenomena from physics to psychology.  
Computational neuroscience, then, has the aim of understanding brains sufficiently well to be 
able to simulate their functions, thereby subsuming the twin goals of science and engineering: deeply 
understanding the inner workings of our brains, and being able to construct simulacra of them. As simple 
robots today substitute for human physical abilities, in settings from factories to hospitals, so brain 
engineering will construct stand-ins for our mental abilities9and possibly even enable us to fix our brains 
when they break.  
 
Brains and Their Construction 
Brains, at one level, consist of ion channels, chemical pumps, specialized proteins. At another 
level, they contain several types of neurons connected via synaptic junctions. These are in turn composed 
into networks consisting of repeating modules of carefully arranged circuits. These networks are arrayed 
in interacting brain structures and systems, each with distinct internal wiring and each carrying out 
distinct functions. As in most complex systems, each level arises from those below it but is not readily 
reducible to its constituents. Our understanding of an organism depends on our understanding of its 
component organs, but also on the ongoing interactions among those parts, as is evident in differentiating 
a living organism from a dead one.  
For instance, kidneys serve primarily to separate and excrete toxins from blood and to regulate 
chemical balances and blood pressure, so a kidney simulacrum would entail a nearly complete set of 
chemical and enzymatic reactions. A brain also monitors many critical regulatory mechanisms, and a 
complete understanding of it will include detailed chemical and biophysical characteristics.  
But brains, alone among organs, produce thought, learning, recognition. No amount of 
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large budgets, we have no artificial systems that rival humans at recognizing faces, nor understanding 
natural languages, nor learning from experience.  
There are, then, crucial principles that brains encode that have so far eluded the best efforts of 
scientists and engineers to decode. Much of computational neuroscience is aimed directly at attempting to 
decipher these principles.  
  Today we cannot yet fully simulate every aspect of a kidney, but we have passed a decisive 
threshold: we can build systems that replicate kidney principles so closely that they can supplant their 
function in patients who have suffered kidney loss or damage. Artificial kidneys do not use the same 
substrate as real kidneys; circuits and microfluidics take the place of cells and tissue, yet they carry out 
operations that are equivalent, and lifesaving, to the human bodies that use them. A primary long-term 
goal of computational neuroscience is to derive scientific principles of brain operation that will catalyze 
the comparable development of prosthetic brains and brain parts.  
 
Do We K now Enough About B rains to Build Them? 
As with any complex system, in the absence of full computational understanding of the brain, we 
proceed by collecting constraints: experimentally observable data can rule out potential explanations. The 
more we can rule out, the closer we are to hypotheses that can account for the facts. Many constraining 
observations have usefully narrowed our understanding of how mental activity arises from brain circuitry; 
these can be organized into five key categories.  
 
Brain component allometry: ',%&3.#!".,&.#)(-"#*-")&.1(,#(<-)0,&&-ize and the 
size of its constituent components. Just knowing the overall brain size of any mammal, we can with great 
precision predict the size of all component structures within the brain. Thus, with few exceptions, brains 
apparently do not and cannot choose which structures to differentially expand or reconfigure.3811 So, quite 
surprisingly, rather than a range of different circuits, or even selective resizing of brain components, 
human brains are instead largely built from the same components as other mammalian brains, in the same 
circuit layouts, with highly predictable relative sizes. Apparently a quantitative change (brain size) results 
in a qualitative one (uniquely human computational capabilities).9, 12 
 
Telencephalic uniformity: Circuits throughout the forebrain (telencephalon) exhibit notably similar 
repeated designs,6,13 with few exceptions,14819 including some slightly different cell types, circuit 
structures, and genes. Yet brain areas purported to underlie unique human abilities (e.g., language) barely 
differ from other structures; there are no extant hypotheses of how the modest observed genetic or 
anatomical differences could engender exceedingly different functions. Taken together, these findings 
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intimate the existence of a few elemental core computational functions that are re-used for a broad range 
of apparently different sensory and cognitive operations.   
 
Anatomical and physiological imprecision: Evidence suggests that neural components are surprisingly 
sloppy (probabilistic) in their operation, very sparsely connected, low-precision, and extraordinarily 
slow,20822 despite exhibiting careful timing under some experimental conditions.23827 Either brains are far 
more precise than we yet understand, or else they carry out families of algorithms whereby precise 
computations arise from imprecise components.28831 If so, this greatly constrains the types of operations 
that any brain circuits could be engaged in.  
 
Task specification: Though artificial telephone operators field phone inquiries with impressive voice 
recognition, we know that they could do far better. The only reason we know this is that human operators 
substantially outperform them; there are no other formal specifications whatsoever that characterize the 
voice recognition task.32,33 Engineers began by believing that they understood the task sufficiently to 
construct artificial operators. It has turned out that their specification of the task does not match the 
actual, still highly elusive set of steps that humans actually perform in recognizing speech. Without 
formal task specifications, the only way to equal human performance may be to come to understand the 
brain mechanisms that give rise to the behavior. 
 
Parallel processing: Some recognition tasks take barely a few hundred milliseconds,34,35 corresponding 
to no more than hundreds of serial neural steps (of milliseconds each), strongly indicating myriad neurons 
acting in parallel,36 imposing a very strong constraint on the types of operations that individual neurons 
could be carrying out. Yet parallelism in computer science, even on a small scale, such as two or three 
-#'/&.()/-)*,.#)(-"-*,)0(0,3&/-#0"3 ),#(-.()(<.)/,/&-core or quad-core 
computers run two or four times faster than single-core systems? The (painfully direct) answer is that we 
simply do not yet know how to divide most software into parts that can effectively exploit the presence of 
these additional hardware elements. Even for readily parallelizable software, it is challenging to design 
hardware that yields scalable returns as processors are added.37,38 It is increasingly possible that principles 
of brain architecture may help identify novel and powerful parallel machine designs.  
 
F rom Circuits to Algorithms to Prosthetics 
There are several promising instances in which different laboratories (even laboratories that are 
competing with each other) have arrived at substantial points of agreement about what certain brain areas 
are likely doing. A notable success story arises from studies of the basal ganglia, which takes two kinds of 
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such skills as riding a bike.30, 39865   
In addition, there is a growing consensus that circuits in the neocortex, by far the largest set of 
brain structures in humans, carry out another, quite different kind of learning: the ability to rapidly learn 
new facts and to organize newly acquired knowledge into vast hierarchical structures that encode complex 
relationships, such as categories and subcategories, episodes, and relations.28, 66874 
And these two systems are connected to each other, via far-reaching cortico-basal ganglia (aka 
cortico-striatal) loops .49 The basal ganglia system carries out the computational operations of skill 
learning (reinforcement learning) while cortical circuits computationally construct vast hierarchies of 
facts and relations among facts. Interestingly, computational research on reinforcement learning has found 
that adding hierarchies to the process can greatly improve learning performance .75,76 Our ancestors 
(reptiles and early mammals) were largely driven by the basal ganglia, whereas mammalian evolution has 
hugely expanded the relative size of the neocortex. By consistently increasing the size ratio of the 
neocortex to the basal ganglia, mammalian brain evolution may be solving a specific computational 
puzzle.29, 75879 Our understanding of human and animal learning abilities is being advanced by these 
computational studies, and we are developing novel methods for machine learning, enabling more 
powerful computer algorithms for analysis of complex data ranging from medical to commercial to 
financial applications.  
Meanwhile, as study of these primary cortico-striatal brain structures remains very much still in 
progress, great advances have been made in deep, computational understanding of certain circumscribed 
brain systems, in particular those involved in early sensory transduction and perception. The results have 
been striking.  
Analysis of cochlear mechanisms has led to the construction of prosthetics that serve today as 
cures for more than 100,000 people who have lost their hearing.80 Retinal prosthetics are in advanced 
development.81885 In a recent study, patients with retinal implants recognized printed letters of size and 
distance comparable to reading a book in relatively low light. And experimental prosthetic arms can 
respond to brain-initiated control; people learn to control the arm simply by deciding to move it.86, 87  
These sensory and motor findings have also led to formalizations of the general problem of acting 
in environments that are only partly observable and are dynamically changing, such as robotics or 
automated navigation; the result is a set of increasingly impressive robotic methods that see and navigate 
in complex surroundings.88 In a series of trials run by the Department of Defense over the last several 
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years, vehicles were, for the first time, able to navigate through real urban traffic, merging, passing, 
parking, and negotiating intersections, with no human control. Retinal algorithms operate equally well on 
other sensors such as radar; and prosthetic limb algorithms are wholly applicable to robots. Many of the 
algorithms that operate robots and automated vehicles are closely related to those that operate prosthetic 
limbs.  
As we come to computationally understand how these peripheral sensorimotor systems work, the 
distinction between natural and artificial is being eroded. A breed of robots that share many of our own 
dexterity and perceptual abilities is likely to emerge directly from this research. As these increasingly 
biologically-based robots, or biots, come to replace human skilled labor, the economic and social 
consequences may be substantial.  
 
F rom Percept to Concept 
The primary differences between human brains and those of other animals lie not in our sensory 
or motor mechanisms, which are largely shared across many species, but rather in cognitive abilities: 
association, representation, reasoning. Despite great advances in peripheral prosthetics, there is no 
commensurate understanding of advanced cognition.  
The abilities of peripheral circuits (retina, cochlea, initial thalamic and cortical regions) are 
largely built in at birth via genetic programs and shaped in early childhood during developmentally 
critical periods. In contrast, the rest of the neocortex will use those built-in systems to acquire masses of 
specific information about the environment over a lifetime. Neocortical circuits are not born with 
knowledge of particular scenes, faces, or actions; these are acquired through sensorimotor experience: 
observing and interacting with objects and events in our surroundings. Cortical circuits are engaged 
almost entirely in fact learning: rapid, permanent acquisition and organization of everyday occurrences. 
The low-level biological mechanisms underpinning long-term fact learning (permanent, anatomical 
synaptic changes, rather than inherently ephemeral chemical changes) are becoming understood.89 But the 
neocortex is not just a passive warehouse of billions of isolated facts; we can arbitrarily associate them, 
recall them, embellish them.33 Association, recall, retrieval, organization9all that we can actually do with 
memory9depends on mechanisms that are as yet still unknown.  
Early cortical areas, then, deal with recognizing objects (even in different lighting, settings, and 
clutter), but some laboratories are increasingly focusing on cortical circuits that are beyond the early 
sensory areas: the vast remainder of the neocortex that somehow encodes sequences, associations, and 
abstract relations.33, 90899  
Seeing a phone, we perceive not only its visual form but also its affordances (calling, texting, 
photographing, playing music), our memories of it (when we got it, where we have recently used it), and a 
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wealth of potential associations (our ringtone, whom we might call, whether it is charged, etc.). The 
questions of how cross-modal information is learned and integrated, and in what form the knowledge is 
stored9how percepts become concepts9now constitute the primary frontier of work in computational 
neuroscience. In this borderland between perception and cognition, the peripheral language of the senses 
is transmuted to the internal lingua franca of the brain, freed from literal sensation and formulated into 
internal representations that can include a wealth of associations.  
Even our simplest perceptions often rely on top-down processing: using stored memory 
representations to inform our ongoing perception and recognition. In some circumstances, we can 
recognize objects in just tens of milliseconds,34,35 so rapidly that it is unlikely that any top-down pathways 
,3.(!!.)(1<,3)(-#'*&,)!(#.#)n, to the far richer range of inference, 
association, and even language, memories strongly influence our perceptions. Merely thinking of a car is 
sufficient to activate the same early visual areas that would have been triggered by actually seeing the car, 
including its shape, size, color, and other features.1008102  
These early visual areas are just one instance of the spread of activation from a triggering 
memory.1038105 Thinking of a car may also activate many other areas, as yet largely unmapped, that 
encode knowledge of how to open car doors, turn ignition keys, steer, accelerate, brake9or information 
about what particular car you own, where it is parked, and so on. Today we can experimentally test for 
visual shape information because we know a great deal about how to decode neural responses that occur 
in early visual areas,106 but we have comparatively modest data for other associative knowledge.1078109 
Computational models of spreading activation110,111 are now striving to make contact with specific neural 
mechanisms and brain pathways, to arrive at convergent hypotheses like those of peripheral sensory 
systems.  
 
Computing Individual Differences: F rom Neurotypes to Cognotypes 
Though all of us have extraordinarily similar brains, even small differences can be striking. 
Whether particular characteristics are genetic, developmental, or learned is still often impossible to 
ascertain, but individual behavioral differences are highly likely to directly correspond to individual brain 
differences, whether genetic or acquired. Most work in computational neuroscience9from perception to 
cognition, from anatomy to computational models9has focused on one agent at a time, one brain at a 
time. A further frontier will be to confront differences among individuals.  
Our bodies are built by genetic programs that became locked into particular patterns early on in 
mammalian evolution: four appendages; eyes above nose above mouth between ears; ten fingers and ten 
toes. We are not optimized to have just these features and no others; most of the variations that we might 
imagine9nose above eyes; five limbs; tentacles instead of hands9have never been tried by evolution, 
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prebuilt modules that have been bundled for hundreds of millions of years.112,113  
Brain components are body components, so it is not surprising that evolutionary brain changes 
also are highly predictable, exhibiting selectional pressure only within the constraints of prescribed 
regularities: all mammals have almost exactly the same brain regions, in the same allometric size 
relationship, wired extraordinarily similarly.5,6,9 It is hypothesized that the relatively modest brain 
#  ,(-.".))/,,:(&#4;#nto a relatively small set of categories. Brains create behaviors, 
and brain differences can create behavioral differences.  
Because brain differences tend to follow certain patterns of architectural arrangements, or 
neurotypes, individual differences then tend to fall into groups, which correspondingly can be referred to 
as cognotypes. These can be described as a range of recognized characteristics of differential cognitive 
types,114,115 such as types of psychopathy, personality attributes of introversion or extraversion, 
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combination of inherited (genetic or polygenic) and acquired (developed or learned) characteristics. 
3'*.)'-) -*,!,<- ),#(-.(can include the seemingly arbitrary combination of high 
mathematical and engineering abilities with low social abilities, whereas there tend not to be behavioral 
types combining, say, high empathy with synesthesia, or low motor abilities with unusually high face-
recognition abilities.  
1)(<."#0 /&&)'*/..#)(&/(,-.(#(!) "/'(,#(-/(.#&1/(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only certain variants tend to occur, and until we can model how it is that architectural brain differences 
can mechanistically generate cognitive differences. There are likely to be salient philosophical questions 
of will and intent, and ethical questions of capacity and culpability that will, it is hoped, be clarified as our 
understanding deepens.  
 
Extrapolations 
The field of computat#)(&(/,)-#(#-/(#+/&3-#./..),3*..",#(<-'"(#-'-
to construe the perceptual and memorial abilities that still stymie our best engineering efforts. Once we 
crack the code, we finally will be able to construct systems that equal human performance at perceptual 
tasks. And having finally understood the underlying mechanisms, we may very well be able at long last to 
improve on them. There is no known formal reason why the capabilities of our brains may not eventually 
be equaled or exceeded.  
There are economics to these advances, and policy implications abound. When auditory implants 
first became available, the scientific community widely doubted their efficacy. It took years of 
demonstration before they were accepted. They are expensive: today their cost can run to $100,000 per 
Cerebrum, January 2011 
9 
 
patient. And there are risks: the surgical implantation procedure may lead to a higher incidence of 
meningitis.116,117 Moreover, there are social complications: some in the deaf community find cochlear 
implants to be ethically misplaced, arguing that the deaf should not be thought of as disabled at all, but 
,.",-:'#(),#.3/&./,&!,)/*;118 
What of brain parts that are deeper than just the peripheral hearing system? Traumatic brain 
injury can cause debilitating deficits in memory and cognition; at present, such injuries are extremely 
difficult even to diagnose, let alone to treat. Implants to restore lost cognitive abilities for such accident 
victims would be revolutionary, and would be welcomed.  
But if implants existed for accident-induced cognitive losses, could they also be used to augment 
/(#($/,)!(#.#0 /(.#)(",#--/!!-.#00#( ,)',/!-
-)'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.#)(-
may improve memory in people with mild cognitive impairment9but the FDA has not yet approved the 
use of any treatments for these lesser conditions.119,120 How would regulators at the FDA react if it 
became possible to augment our brains9implants to help us think faster or to increase our memory 
capacity? The economic, social, and political concomitants of such technology would surely eclipse those 
arising from cochlear implants.  
Each brain contains idiosyncrasies; our brains define who we are. The way we interact, the kinds 
of decisions we make, the connections we perceive9all arise from the still-obscure mechanisms of the 
vast span of thalamocortical circuits and cortico-striatal loops in our heads. These repeating components 
give us our mammalian abilities, our uniquely human faculties, and our individual characteristics. The 
computational understanding of individual and group differences will likely lead to a new science of 
different types of cognitive behavior, with implications ranging from law to education.  The formerly 
familiar terrain of human nature may appear quite different in this light; perhaps, arriving there, we will 
truly know the place for the first time.   
Our abilities are not inimitable; brain circuits are circuits, albeit nonstandard ones, and they will 
yield to analysis. As computational neuroscience comes to demystify them, we verge on an era of new 
frontiers in science and medicine, in which we can increasingly repair, enhance, and likely supplant the 
biological engines we think with.  
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